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ADDRESS BY
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE BUSINESS COUNCIL
AT THE HOMESTEAD, HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1961 - 9:00 P.M. (EST), - 10:00 P.M. (EDT)

As we meet together this evening, I can think of no group of people who share more common interests in the governing of the United States than do those of us here. Most of the businesses you represent do work for the government. Many of you like myself have at times taken leave from your private concerns to serve the public welfare. Without your support the defense of the United States could not be maintained. There will always be many matters at issue between us and many problems of government - business relations to be resolved. But I doubt that there will ever be major insoluble differences between us when the security of our country is at stake. And veritably it is today.

It seemed to me, therefore, that rather than dwell on our problems -- and we have them to deal with -- I should try to develop further for you the thinking behind our present defense policies and programs. It has been my observation that the only way to keep the Government's defense policy clear in the minds of those not in Government is by constant reiteration. Inevitably, in the course of public discussion, misinterpretations and misunderstandings of defense policy develop. It may be because we in Government fail to make ourselves clear in the first place. Perhaps we take it too much for granted that having once stated a policy we have fulfilled our task of achieving public understanding. Or perhaps the subject is so complex that it requires a continuing dialogue between the Government and the people. Whatever the reason, I am convinced that we have not yet succeeded in getting across to the public at large a full understanding of the defense policies we are now pursuing. Even for such well informed individuals as yourselves, it could be worthwhile for me to restate our defense objectives and what we are doing to achieve them.

Twice in this century we have gone unprepared into global conflicts and then waited until the war potential of our economy could be called upon to see us through. Today, now that quick nuclear destruction has become possible, we can no longer place such reliance on long-range potential and second chances. We therefore plan to obligate, in this

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current fiscal year, about \$50 billion for military readiness and civil defense, the largest security expenditure for any peacetime year in our history. This figure is an increase of \$6 billion above a year ago, and \$9 billion higher than the year before that. Actual expenditures, which will rise to about \$47 billion this year, can be expected to climb still higher in subsequent years unless we achieve significant reductions in the world's international tensions.

How do we go about the conversion of these vast sums into defense programs to support our national policies?

First of all, in January of this year, the President set in motion a major review of our defense posture and policies which has already brought some significant changes, including the budget increase I have just mentioned; and further changes are still being considered. One of the President's conclusions was that our arms must be adequate to protect our commitments and ensure our security without being bound by arbitrary budget ceilings. At the same time he envisaged that military economies would result from management improvements in government and industry, and ultimately perhaps from agreements for the control and limitation of arms. The President was determined that our strategic power must be sufficient to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on this country or its allies by being able to survive a first strike by the enemy with sufficient arms to penetrate his defenses and inflict unacceptable losses upon him.

President Kennedy also called for greatly increasing our ability to handle lower levels of conflicts, including local wars and those sub-limited, guerrilla-type struggles which have constituted the most familiar threats to the free world since 1945. He has also determined to improve the flexibility of our defenses, by improving our ability to make swift, selective responses to enemy attacks on the free world regardless of time, place or choice of weapons. At the same time the new Administration embarked upon a political action program designed to reduce the danger

of general thermonuclear war due to error or enemy miscalculation or the runaway spread of a smaller conflict. Thus, while we are making all honorable efforts for a diplomatic solution to the problems of Berlin and Germany, we are intensively studying the organizational and technical aspects of our "command and control" systems to assure a controlled response to any form of aggression.

Berlin is the emergency of the moment, because the Soviets have chosen to make it so. We have responded immediately, with our western allies, by reinforcing our garrisons in that beleaguered city. We have called up some 150,000 reservists, increased our draft calls and extended the time in service of many who are already in uniform. These are the so-called quick-fix measures which we have invoked to improve the western tactical position in Berlin and remind the Soviets that the city is not an open invitation to that variety of aggression which has been described as the salami, or one slice at a time, method.

But our real strength in Berlin -- and at any other point in the perimeter of the free world's defenses that might tempt the Communist probes -- is much more broadly based.

Our confidence in our ability to deter Communist action, or resist Communist blackmail, is based upon a sober appreciation of the relative military power of the two sides. We doubt that the Soviet leadership has

in fact any less realistic views, although this may not be always apparent from their extravagant claims. While the Soviets use rigid security as a military weapon, their Iron Curtain is not so impenetrable as to force us to accept at face value the Kremlin's boasts.

The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power than an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part. The U. S. has today hundreds of manned intercontinental bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union, including 600 heavy bombers and many more medium bombers equally capable of intercontinental operations because of our highly developed in-flight refueling techniques and world-wide base structure. The U. S. also has 6 POLARIS submarines at sea carrying a total of 96 missiles, and dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Our carrier strike forces and land-based theater forces could deliver additional hundreds of megatons. The total number of our nuclear delivery vehicles, tactical as well as strategic, is in the tens of thousands; and of course, we have more than one warhead for each vehicle.

Our forces are so deployed and protected that a sneak attack could not effectively disarm us. The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great as -- perhaps greater than -- the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike. In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear conflict.

It might be appropriate at this point to say a few words about the Soviet's announced intention to explode a 50 megaton thermonuclear device at the end of October. Our own scientists and military leaders examined the utility of weapons of this and even larger yields several years ago and concluded that the military value was so questionable that it was not worth developing such weapons even though we had the know-how and capacity to do so. While there might be some military advantages from extremely large yields, there are also operational disadvantages. It is therefore quite clear that the Russian's primary purpose is terror. With the customary Soviet heavy-handedness, the timing has been chosen with one eye on Berlin and the other on the 22nd Party Congress. Perhaps this is also the Soviet Union's answer to the discordant voice from its populous neighbor to the south.

As to the test itself, explosions of this size are not necessary for development purposes. As pointed out in a recent White House statement, "we believe the peoples of the world will join us in asking the Soviet Union not to proceed with a test which can serve no legitimate purpose and which adds a mass of additional radioactive fallout." If the Soviets proceed with such an unnecessary and possibly risky test, despite urgings to the contrary, we trust that this latest outrage will remove the doubts of even their most indulgent apologists among the non-aligned nations who failed to protest the Soviet resumption of testing during the Belgrade Conference.

Notwithstanding what the White House called the "unconfessed political purpose" behind this particular test, we must and we do take seriously the Soviet Union's military technology and the likelihood of future improvements in its nuclear strike posture. We are therefore increasing the survivability of our retaliatory force by programs of hardening, concealment and mobility.

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We have accelerated deliveries of POLARIS submarines and hastened the development schedule for a greatly improved version of the missiles they carry. We have expanded the development of the MINUTEMAN, our solid-fuel, land-launched missile and enlarged its production capacity. We are proceeding simultaneously with the development of advanced air-to-ground missiles, such as the SKYBOLT, in order to extend the useful life of the manned bomber further into the missile age.

To protect the deterrent effect of our existing bomber forces, we have upped the number of planes on ground alert, and we are working to increase the dependability of our warnings against surprise attack by installing bomb alarm detectors and signals at SAC bases and other key points. Our planners are working on many other important research programs such as missile defense and penetration aids, satellite based communication systems and possible military uses of space.

In the interest of protecting our civilian population from radioactive fallout, we have made a fresh start on a national shelter program under the aegis of the Department of Defense to which have been transferred important new responsibilities in the civilian defense field.

The weapons that form the backbone of our deterrent strength are formidable, and we intend to keep them so. But if we had no effective weapons but the big ones, a small scale communist aggression could confront us with a choice between the risk of general war and a political retreat. Hence we are looking to the condition of our conventional forces, so that a potential enemy may not be tempted to steal from under our noses, gambling that we would not call out the weapons of massive nuclear destruction in response to ambiguous aggression or deliberate probing by the enemy. Let me make clear that we are seeking to acquire flexibility rather than rigidity in the options open to us. This requires a strengthening of conventional, non-nuclear arms; it does not rule out the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war if our interests should so require.

We are placing a new emphasis on our ability to meet limited and guerrilla warfare by expanding research on conventional weapons, improving air and sealift capacities for moving large numbers of troops to crisis areas on short notice, and increasing the procurement of the weapons for limited war. The substantial additional purchases of conventional weapons and equipment include tactical aircraft, tanks, rifles, personnel carriers, artillery and stocks of ammunition.

I might note here that our Military Assistance Program is designed to deal with aggression in its incipient phases, by helping friendly nations to improve their internal security and making local wars and forays against them unprofitable. Our assistance to our NATO allies should also help to deter general war.

As the pressures have mounted on Berlin, we have retained in service or reactivated ships and planes with tactical, troop-carrying or anti-submarine capabilities. We have at the same time started to draw on available manpower pools for substantial increases in the armed services totalling to date about 325,000 men, by extending active duty tours, stepping up the draft, and by recalling reservists to active duty.

These immediate measures are concerned chiefly with Berlin. No one can say how long that crisis will be with us, or where the next Soviet experiment in international anxiety may be scheduled. Probably we are in for a period of protracted tension and we are making our plans accordingly. Southeast Asia is currently under severe pressure, and other areas are not immune.

Obviously, it would be to the advantage of an adversary if we let him rush us into a succession of mobilizations and demobilizations according to his dictates. Instead, it is to our advantage to maintain a ready force of well-equipped regulars which can be augmented in a relatively short time by trained reserve forces. Accordingly, the Army's current goal is to ready a number of priority Reserve or National Guard divisions for call-up on not more than eight weeks' notice. This Army plan will, of course, require corresponding stocks of modern weapons and ammunition to be on hand, and the complementary air and naval units must be brought to active duty status with comparable speed.

This program of accelerated reserve training and modern weapons improvement is intentionally short of full national mobilization, but nevertheless gives us a very real addition to our forces in Europe. First, we and the other Western powers have agreed to bring up to full strength our present units in the Central European Theatre. At home, meanwhile, we are converting to combat readiness the three of our Army's 14 divisions previously engaged in training missions. Later this year, therefore, this country will have ready for immediate deployment six Army divisions and two divisions of Marines, plus the two National Guard divisions already recalled and any other reserves that may hereafter be ordered to duty. Thus, if the clouds over Berlin should darken further between now and winter, the Defense establishment could move to Europe on short notice six or more divisions, more than doubling, if need be, the potent American fighting forces currently assigned to NATO. Meanwhile, large amounts of military equipment and supplies are being prepositioned overseas.

Concurrently with the Army build-up, a number of Air National Guard fighter units have been recalled to provide the necessary air cover and support overseas, and the Air Force has also augmented its airlift capacity by canceling the deactivation of certain transport squadrons and calling up others.

For its part, the Navy is improving its amphibious transport, taking action to permit the assignment of a third carrier to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, and extending antisubmarine patrols on the North Atlantic sealanes. The result will be a general strengthening of

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naval readiness around the world, thereby bolstering our national deterrent strength and contributing importantly to U. S. resources for limited war. The Navy is constantly improving its vessels through modernization and the procurement of more advanced weapons systems. Nuclear submarines are entering the fleets in increasing numbers; guided missiles are replacing guns on destroyers, frigates and cruisers, and Mach 2 speed aircraft are operating from attack carriers.

Our present plan, as I have indicated, is to count on a ready reserve as a means of quick force augmentation in emergencies. The alternative, which has its advocates, would be substantial increase in our permanent force levels. Let us take a look at the choice we face.

For every fighting man added to our active military forces, the cost is at least \$5,000 a year just for pay and allowances, subsistence, clothing and transportation, without counting the modern combat equipment he needs, ranging from infantry rifles to the latest in nuclear submarines. A larger standing Army would also mean greater overhead costs, in terms of more military installations and added administrative and support facilities. In the long run, as individual duty tours and enlistments are completed, training costs for replacements would also go up.

The Ready Reserve is much less costly to maintain. Members of reserve units are paid only for their weekly and annual training periods. The major items of equipment they require, such as air and sea transport, heavy artillery and tactical aircraft, need not be constantly exercised and can be provided by Air Force and Naval Reserve units when Army reservists are called to active duty.

In reviewing our current preparedness programs, which have already been brought up to record levels for non-wartime, we have asked ourselves whether we could buy enough extra protection by further enlarging our permanent forces to offset the added costs and disadvantages I have mentioned. The answer appears to be no. We must ever be mindful, however, of the fact that the Moscow-Peiping axis is capable of generating simultaneous crises in widely separated parts of the globe. The free world could conceivably be faced with critical situations at the same time in more than one area of the world. Should it prove necessary to deploy U. S. forces in support of two or more threatened areas, additional Reserve and National Guard divisions could be activated in order to provide impressive increments to our strength.

We recognize, of course, that divisions yet to be mobilized represent potential power rather than power in being. Were it to become apparent that to deal with multiple trouble situations a further increase in our permanent forces is needed, then the Congress will be

asked to make the required resources available, and all of us will be called upon for new sacrifices of money, time and energy. Until that contingency occurs, our reserve program should give us strength and flexibility in the most economical manner.

As we hasten the build-up of our conventional forces, we might remind ourselves that, after all, the nations of the NATO alliance have more people, greater economic resources and further advanced technologies than all of the Warsaw Pact countries combined. Moreover, the Soviets may well have reason to doubt the military dependability of their European satellites in a showdown.

Let me sum up, then, where our defenses stand today. First, we continue to rely on our strategic nuclear weapons to convince a would-be aggressor that he could not emerge standing from a general war of his own instigation and we are keeping those weapons up to date. Secondly, we are rapidly strengthening our conventional weapons and increasing our ready reserve of trained manpower, to give us an improved, third choice between all-out nuclear retaliation and retreat. Thirdly, we are endeavoring to strengthen and improve the military defenses of our friends in the world in accordance with their needs, with special attention to preventing or confining limited wars, subversion and guerrilla-type insurgency.

We are determined to have flexibility in our choice and mobility of weapons, and in our capacity to respond to repeated crises in the long run without the dislocation of our entire economy.

The Soviet's bluster and threats of rocket attacks against the free world -- aimed particularly at the European members of the NATO alliance -- must be evaluated against the hard facts of United States nuclear superiority which I discussed earlier. Although we are confident that we would ultimately prevail in a test of strength no matter at what level conflict might be initiated by the Soviet Union, this does not alter our determination to seek a peaceful solution to the world's problems.

But those who would impose a totalitarian world order and deny men and nations the right to pursue their own destinies should understand one point very clearly. The United States does not seek to resolve disputes by violence. But if forceful interference with our rights and obligations should lead to violent conflict -- as it well might -- the United States does not intend to be defeated. As the President reminded the world at the UN last month, our country has both the will and the weapons to join free men in standing up to their responsibilities. We in the Defense Department believe that the proper exercise of our will and the development and management of our weapons will eventually force the Soviet Union to participate with us in a step-by-step program to guarantee the peace which so many nations earnestly desire.

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